So why are Africa's borderlands becoming increasingly vulnerable to conflict? The answer is not that borders themselves cause violence. Rather, many frontier regions combine weak state presence, difficult terrain, cross-border communities, illicit economies and unresolved local grievances—conditions that armed groups are adept at exploiting.
Borders Divide States But Connect Communities
Many African borders cut across communities that existed long before modern states were established. Families, ethnic groups, pastoralists and traders have had longstanding connections spanning centuries, long before the colonial era. For local communities, crossing a border is therefore part of everyday life. For governments, however, the same border represents sovereign territory that must be controlled, creating a complicated security environment. This is because the same routes used by traders and pastoralists are also used to move weapons, fighters and illicit goods by criminals and rogue government officials.
In Africa, where government institutions are weak or deeply involved in corruption, armed groups and criminal networks exploit these established connections to set up camps in frontier areas and wage wars amongst themselves or against governments.
The Security Vacuum
Borderlands are often among the most remote parts of African countries. In most cases they are hundreds of kilometres from capitals and major economic centres, with poor road networks, limited communication infrastructure and inadequate public services. This situation creates the perfect grounds for insurgents to operate without much disturbance because these factors give them a kind of security, since any arrival of government security apparatus is detected long before its actual arrival, which takes several days or weeks if moving by road.
A government may have a strong presence in major cities while exercising limited control over large stretches of its frontier for these obvious reasons. While this saves many African governments on finances, it also creates what is effectively known as a governance gap. When the state is absent, other actors move in. These include insurgent groups, criminal networks, traffickers and community militias. The result becomes a cycle in which weak state presence allows armed groups to establish themselves, while insecurity makes it even harder for governments to provide services and develop the region.
The Sahel Illustrates the Problem
The Sahel provides one of the clearest examples. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have endured years of jihadist violence, much of it concentrated in remote territories where borders are difficult to monitor. Groups including Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State-linked organisations have exploited weak state presence and cross-border networks.
The insecurity has increasingly moved towards West Africa's coastal states, particularly areas around Benin and Togo, with the International Crisis Group warning about JNIM's expansion beyond the Sahel, while ACLED has documented growing connections between militant activity, criminal economies and competition over resources across the region. This demonstrates a central feature of modern African conflicts: an insurgency does not necessarily stop when it reaches an international boundary.
Borders Operate as Escape Routes for Insurgents and Criminal Groups
For armed groups, crossing a border provides a strategic advantage because an organisation facing military pressure in one country can retreat into neighbouring territory, regroup and return later, as has been the case with M23 fighters in the Democratic Republic of Congo, who reportedly crossed over to Rwanda, regrouped and returned to wage war against government forces.
This cross-border dynamic creates problems for governments because their security forces generally cannot pursue militants deep into another country without cooperation from that country's authorities. If intelligence-sharing and coordination are weak, armed groups exploit that gap. This brings a new twist into the picture where two countries may have forces operating on opposite sides of the same frontier but still struggle to respond to the same threat due to territorial sovereignty policies. The African Union has recognised this challenge through its Border Programme, which promotes cross-border cooperation, better border governance and conflict prevention.
Conflict Also Follows Money
Security problems in borderlands are also closely linked to economics. Many frontier areas lie along century-old informal trade routes or near valuable natural resources. Smuggling of goods, illegal mining and other illicit activities provide income for armed and organised criminal organisations.
An armed group that controls a route can impose taxes on traders, giving them enough financial muscle to buy weapons. Also, groups operating around mining areas can demand payments or control access to resources. In the long run, this makes conflicts self-financing and more enticing to organised criminals to benefit from the spoils. Even when military operations weaken an armed group, its ability to generate money locally can allow it to recruit new fighters and continue operating.
Local Grievances Matter Too
Not every conflict around Africa's borders is driven by terrorism. Many have roots in disputes over land, livestock, water, political exclusion and natural resources. Climate pressures also intensify competition, particularly between farming and pastoralist communities. Armed groups exploit these grievances by presenting themselves as defenders of particular community interests or by offering alternative systems of taxation, protection or justice.
This is why purely military solutions often fail to produce lasting stability, as was the case with the Ethiopian war in recent years. A government may remove fighters from an area, but if the grievances that helped an armed group gain influence remain unresolved, another group will eventually emerge or the existing group will regroup and join hands with many others.
The Problem Extends Beyond the Sahel
Similar dynamics exist in East Africa. The borderlands linking Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia have experienced insecurity involving insurgency, communal conflict, livestock disputes, political tensions and competition over resources. Here, borders can be both barriers and gateways. They can restrict government security forces while allowing communities, livestock, traders and armed groups to follow traditional routes across countries.
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has experienced decades of conflict involving armed groups, local grievances, regional politics and competition over resources. Because communities and armed networks extend across national boundaries, instability in one country can quickly become a concern for its neighbours.
Border Communities Pay the Highest Price
For people living in these areas, the consequences go beyond military statistics. Violence closes roads they use daily to run their lives, disrupts markets, interrupts schooling and makes farming or pastoralism dangerous. When people flee, neighbouring communities face additional pressure on land, water, employment and public services. The border therefore becomes more than the location of conflict. It becomes part of the mechanism through which instability spreads.
Why African Borders Are Difficult to Secure
Africa has vast borders stretching across deserts, forests, mountains and sparsely populated areas. Governments cannot realistically monitor every kilometre because security forces consequently concentrate resources around major towns, roads and official crossing points. But armed groups do not necessarily use official crossings. They exploit informal routes known to local communities and difficult for authorities to monitor. This means one country's security measures are consequently undermined by weaknesses on the other side of the border. An armed group does not necessarily need to defeat two national armies. It can simply exploit the gaps between them.
The Answer Is More Than Soldiers
Military operations remain necessary where armed groups threaten civilians, but long-term stability requires more than security deployments. Governments need functioning local administrations, roads, schools, health facilities, legitimate markets and economic opportunities in neglected border regions.
Trust matters as well. Communities that feel abandoned or mistreated by the state are less likely to cooperate with security forces, which in effect creates opportunities for armed groups. Cross-border intelligence-sharing and coordinated security operations are equally important. African countries increasingly need to treat border insecurity as a shared regional problem rather than a series of separate national crises.
The Bigger Picture
Africa's borders are not inherently dangerous. Millions of people cross them peacefully every day for trade, work, family visits and pastoralism. The danger emerges when weak governance, poverty, local grievances, illicit economies and armed movements converge in areas where state institutions are limited.
The central lesson is simple: conflict does not respect the lines drawn on a map. Africa's challenge is therefore not simply to make its borders harder to cross. It is to make the borderlands themselves more secure, better governed and economically connected. When governments cooperate across frontiers and communities have legitimate economic opportunities and functioning institutions, the same borders that armed groups exploit can instead become channels for trade, cooperation and regional stability.
With reporting from OECD/SWAC research on political violence in African borderlands, African Union Border Programme, ACLED, International Crisis Group, RUSI and Associated Press.
